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ABSTRACT
This article argues that care infrastructures can shape family income inequality and examines
access to childcare services in the US as a case study. We propose that market-priced childcare
systems generate inequalities in how births impact mothers’ income contributions to families and
aggravate family income inequality as a result. Using the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) merged with state-level childcare prices, we estimate individual fixed effects
regression models for the consequences of births on family income and on its proximate
determinants: mothers’ labor supply and earnings, and partners’ labor supply and earnings. Our
models include state and year fixed effects and identify the impact of childcare costs from
within-state variation in childcare prices. Our analyses show that births increase family income
inequality due to the negative impact of births on mothers’ earnings and that the negative impact
of births on mothers’ earnings is not compensated by increases in partners’ earnings or income
transfers. We find that higher childcare costs accentuate birth earnings penalties for mothers
without college degrees, but not for mothers with college degrees. In all, we show that childcare
costs exacerbate family income gaps between women without and with a college degree by 29
percentage points.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, nearly 4 million new babies are born every year, each requiring 24/7 care
and supervision for several years. The provision of care for newborns and young children up to
school age requires a large amount of human labor that is performed by both paid and unpaid
caregivers. The birth of a child often demands substantial reconfigurations of labor efforts in the
household that affect family income. When someone, disproportionately the mother, drops out of
the labor force to provide care for a newborn, the family loses a source of income. Access to
childcare services can help families avoid income losses that come from reductions in paid work.
However, when access to childcare services depends on purchasing power, as it is the case in
primarily market-priced childcare systems like in the US, higher-income families can more
easily rely on childcare services to avoid income losses, and this might exacerbate family income
inequality.
In a context of rising family income inequality since the 1970s, the economic
consequences of births remain an unexplored mechanism that can contribute to family income
inequality. Existing research about the drivers of rising family income inequality has focused on
changes in labor market processes, widening wage gaps or changes in demographic familyformation processes shifting households’ composition and attributes (McCall and Percheski
2010; Schwartz 2010; Sudo 2017; Western et al. 2016). However, the fact that births leave a
long-lasting mark on women’s earnings (Juhn and McCue 2017; Killewald and García-Manglano
2016; Kleven et al. 2019; Musick, Bea, and Gonalons-Pons 2020) and that women’s earnings
constitute a substantial and growing portion of families’ incomes (Bloome et al. 2019; Glass et
al. 2021), suggest that the economic consequences of births may be important determinants of
families’ economic positions. Furthermore, if the impact of births on families’ economic position
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is unequal, with more negative effects for lower-income families than for higher-income
families, births might constitute an underappreciated mechanism contributing to increasing
family income inequality. Understanding families’ incomes and income disparities when
children are young is also important because these conditions shape children’s wellbeing and
experiences at a critical age (Jackson and Schneider 2022; McLanahan 2004; Schneider,
Hastings, and LaBriola 2018).
While there is an extensive body of scholarship documenting the negative impacts of
births on mothers’ economic outcomes (for recent overviews of this literature see: Ferragina
2020; Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017), we know less about the
impact of births on family income. Birth penalties on mothers’ earnings might translate into
income losses for the family, but not necessarily. Indeed, mothers’ earnings losses could be
offset with additional sources of income (e.g., partners’ earnings or income transfers). In one of
the few analyses directly focused on how births impact family income in the United States,
Stanczyk (2020) finds that household income adequacy declines with births, indicating that birth
penalties on mothers’ earnings translate to declines in family income. Thus, it does not appear
that other sources of income are able to compensate for mothers’ labor earnings losses. In
particular, fathers’ earnings do not substantially increase with births (Killewald and GarcíaManglano 2016; Kleven et al. 2019; Musick et al. 2020; Musick, Gonalons-Pons, and Schwartz
2021).
In this article, we argue that birth penalties contribute not only to the production of
gender inequality but also to the production of family income inequality. We offer a conceptual
framework to articulate the relationship between birth penalties and family income inequality.
This framework describes how birth penalties are importantly determined by the care
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infrastructure and economic tradeoffs when replacing mothers’ unpaid care labor. We define care
infrastructure as policies that shape the availability and prices of care services as well as policies
that deliver income transfers for unpaid caregivers. 1 We empirically examine this argument by
examining the US market-priced childcare system. We expect that market-priced childcare
services exacerbate inequalities in how births impact mothers’ economic outcomes and that these
inequalities reverberate in the distribution of family income. More precisely, we expect that more
expensive childcare disproportionately discourages post-birth paid work among women with
lower earnings potential, and that this leads to substantial income losses for families in the lower
half of the income distribution. In the absence of processes offsetting the negative impact of
childcare prices on mothers’ income contributions to families, this mechanism will result in an
increase in family income inequality.
We use individual fixed effects regression models to estimate how births and childcare
costs impact family income, examining all major proximate determinants of family income:
mothers’ labor supply and earnings, partners’ labor supply and earnings, and income transfers
from public programs. We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
and time-varying state-level information on average childcare prices. Our models control for
individual and state fixed effects: we are thus explaining an individual mother’s earning losses as
a function of the variation in childcare costs over time within a state: for example, if a mother
without a college degree in Pennsylvania gives birth at a time when Pennsylvania’s childcare

Care infrastructure is a relatively novel term that has gained popularity during the COVID-19 Pandemic. It was
originally coined by Ai-Jen Poo, recipient of the MacArthur Genius Award and prominent labor activist of domestic
worker rights, who has written extensively about the need to invest in public infrastructure for care provision (e.g.,
Poo 2016). There are other concepts in the literature that relate to care infrastructure, such as the social organization
of care provision (Folbre 2012) or the concept of care regimes (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). For the purpose of this
study, we find care infrastructure a useful concept to highlight policies related to care provision, while the concepts
of social organization of care provision or care regimes are often used to refer to a broader range of contextual
characteristics including, for instance, social norms about caregiving that we do not address in this study.
1
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costs are lower, we expect her to have lower post-birth earnings losses, and thus higher family
income. We show that childcare costs fuel inequalities in women’s labor supply responses to
births, with a $1,000 increase in the annual price of childcare (representing an 11% increase over
the mean childcare price of $9,500) being associated with a 0.7 hour decline in weekly work
hours and a 15 percent decline in monthly earnings for women without college degrees. In
contrast, higher childcare costs have no statistically significant effect on work hours or earnings
for women with college degrees or for men. Taken together, we find that childcare costs
exacerbate family income inequality between women, with each additional $1,000 increase in the
annual price of childcare being associated with a 5 percent decline in family income for women
without a college degree (the average decline is 18 percent for this group), but virtually no
change among women with college degrees.
Our study makes three key contributions. First, we make a theoretical contribution by
developing a framework that articulates the relationship between care infrastructure and family
income inequality. Second, our research design improves the identification strategy to estimate
the relationship between childcare costs and the economic penalties of births. Our panel
regression models with individual and state fixed effects improve on prior research that has
largely relied on cross-sectional models; likewise, we leverage independently collected data on
actual state-level childcare prices, while previous studies using panel data have often relied on
predicted childcare prices data or focused on policy interventions that impact only specific
population subgroups. Lastly, our study also contributes to expanding our understanding of the
economic impact of births, broadening the current focus on mothers’ economic outcomes to
study its impacts on family income and on family income inequality.
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BACKGROUND
The existing literature about birth penalties on mothers’ economic outcomes includes
considerable signs that having children might significantly impact families’ economic positions,
although family income has not been a focus in this literature. For instance, studies show that
births leave long-lasting marks on mothers’ economic outcomes (employment, hours of paid
work, wages, earnings), but that they have much smaller impacts on father’s economic outcomes,
providing little indication about the possibility of men’s earnings offsetting mothers’ earnings
losses (Aisenbrey and Fasang 2017; Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Cooke
2014; Doren 2019; England et al. 2016; Florian 2018; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Killewald 2013;
Killewald and García-Manglano 2016; Musick et al. 2020). Kleven (2019), for instance,
estimates that in the United States the transition to parenthood is associated with a long-term 31
percent decline in mothers’ earnings but neither decline nor increase in fathers’ earnings.
The existing literature also includes signs that the consequences of births are moderated
by social policies and that the consequences of births might exacerbate economic inequalities.
Studies find that social policies and social norms can moderate the size of birth penalties (for
recent overviews of this literature see: Ferragina 2020; Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Olivetti
and Petrongolo 2017). Budig and colleagues (2012), for instance, find that the difference in
employment levels between mothers and non-mothers is lower in countries with parental leave
and public childcare, particularly when gender norms support mothers’ employment. Recent
studies relying on regional variation within the United States find similar patterns (Landivar,
Ruppanner, and Scarborough 2021; Landivar, Ruppanner, et al. 2021; Ruppanner et al. 2021).
Studies also find that birth penalties might be larger for lower-income women and that policies
might moderate birth penalties differently for higher and lower income women (Del Boca,
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Pasqua, and Pronzato 2009; Hook and Paek 2020; Keck and Saraceno 2013). Hook and Paek’s
(2020) cross-national comparative study, for instance, finds that the correlation between
spending on early childhood education and the difference between mothers’ and non-mothers’
employment is stronger for mothers without a college degree than for mothers with a college
degree. Studies focused on childcare costs find a similar pattern, indicating that childcare costs
exacerbate birth penalties for mothers with lower earnings potential compared to mothers with
higher earnings potential (Anderson and Levine 1999; Baum II 2002; Kaestner, Lubotsky, and
Qureshi 2016; Landivar, Scarborough, et al. 2021; Ruppanner et al. 2021; Tekin 2007a).
Despite the pattern of findings pointing in a direction consistent with the idea that birth
penalties and the care infrastructure can shape family income inequality, we do not have a
conceptual framework nor an empirical record to precisely quantify whether and how births
shape family inequality. While family earnings losses can be implied from studies on
motherhood penalties, direct estimates are often lacking because the focus has been on labor
supply or hourly wage measures. Furthermore, the existing evidence about the potential sources
of income offsetting the losses of mothers’ earnings at the family level is incomplete, because
research about the impact of births on fathers’ outcomes or on other sources of family income
has not been as comprehensive as the research on penalties on mothers’ outcomes. The impact of
births on family income has been the focus in only a handful of studies (Aassve, Mazzuco, and
Mencarini 2005; Bould, Crespi, and Schmaus 2012; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007), with
just one of these in the US (Stanczyk 2020). Stanczyk (2020) offers the most comprehensive
study of household income dynamics around births in the United States and provides direct
evidence that births are associated with declines in family income, in particular family income
adequacy. Stanczyk (2020), however, does not focus on family income inequality nor on care
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infrastructure. To conceptualize these relationships, the next section introduces a framework that
explicitly articulates how birth penalties shape family income inequality depending on the
features of the care infrastructure.
Care Events, Care Infrastructure, and Family Income Inequality
We propose a replacement costs framework to articulate the role of the care infrastructure and
births in the production of family income inequality. The purpose of this framework is to center
the intensity of structured constraints on mothers’ labor as key determinants of birth penalties.
This framework answers calls to integrate births and childcare within broader frameworks of
care needs (Folbre 2012; Folbre and Wright 2012) and is grounded in the tradition of social
reproduction theory that highlights the volume of human labor needed to sustain and care for
human beings (Bhattacharya 2017; Laslett and Brenner 1989).
Our framework begins with the premise that a central challenge that arises with births is a
labor challenge: how to meet the need for human care labor demanded by newborns. In contrast
to conceptual models of mothers’ labor supply that emphasize mothers’ attributes, work
orientations, and/or their job opportunities as predictors of labor supply behavior, our framework
will focus instead on the constraints and economic tradeoffs implied by different ways of
meeting the care labor demands that arise with births. Newborns’ need for 24/7 care and
supervision for several years represents a very substantial increase in care labor demand that
needs to be met by someone: typically the mother, paid caregivers, partners, relatives, or a
combination of these. Characterizing births as care labor demand shocks connects births to other
episodes that pose similar labor challenges because they likewise increase individuals’
responsibility to meet care needs, such as children or adults developing disabilities or recovering
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from accidents or surgical interventions. Our replacement costs framework can be applied to
model individuals’ employment behavior after births as well as after other episodes that also give
rise to care labor demand shocks.
The replacement costs framework models mothers’ labor supply as a function of the
economic tradeoffs involved in replacing own unpaid care labor. Because women continue to be
socially assigned the responsibility of caregiving (Glenn 2010), mothers’ unpaid care labor is
socially seen as the default way of meeting the demand for care labor arising with births, and
alternative options are considered against this default (see, for instance, studies discussing how
household outsourcing spending is evaluated against mothers’ potential earnings or how mothers
and childcare services are seen as direct substitutes: e.g., Gupta 2007; Rao 2020). Since mothers’
labor supply is a key driver of birth penalties on earnings and family income, this means that our
model expects birth penalties to be larger when the ability to find someone to care for newborns
is very limited and/or not cost effective. From our standpoint, the ability to find someone to care
for the newborn becomes a crucial determinant of birth penalties –if nobody is available to care
for the newborn except the mother, many mothers will have to quit their jobs and incur large
earnings losses. When replacement for unpaid labor exists, our model expects birth penalties to
be importantly determined by the costs of these replacements. If others are available to care for
the newborn but procuring their services is expensive, adopting this option will generally be cost
effective only for those whose rewards from paid work are high enough to offset the costs of
paid care services. In other words, all else being equal, our model expects that average birth
penalties will decline when replacement costs are low and increase when replacement costs are
high.
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Consider the following simple model. Childcare costs is p per hour and the mother’s
wage is w per hour. Mothers’ income y can be defined as y=h(w-p) if she works h hours; if there
is free childcare provided by the government or relatives, then p=0. Note that childcare costs p
act as a tax on wages, implying that the take home pay is lower than it would be in the absence of
the childcare costs. Assume there is a care income b (i.e., a policy income transfer program for
individuals with care responsibilities): if the mother is not employed, y=b; if there is no such care
income then b=0. We focus on the monetary incentives and take other factors shaping mothers’
decisions about work as given. It is clear that if w<p, i.e. if the mother’s hourly wage is lower
than the hourly cost of childcare, there is a strong disincentive and barrier to paid work. In
general, the lower a woman’s wage relative to the cost of childcare, the less likely she is going to
be employed. Clearly, if the cost of childcare is zero (p=0), such as when childcare is freely
provided by the government or by relatives, the cost of childcare will not influence a woman’s
decision to seek employment, and she will be more likely to be employed than with any positive
cost of childcare (p>0). If a mother can receive a fixed income b for taking care of her own child,
then not working is financially advantageous if b> h(w-p), i.e. if this income is higher than the
net earnings that the woman would bring home. The condition b> h(w-p) is equivalent to
w<b/h+p, i.e. if a woman’s wage is low enough, it is more financially advantageous to take care
of her newborn than to be employed. Note that when the cost of childcare p increases and/or the
caregivers’ income b increases, it is more likely for any particular woman to have a low enough
wage to satisfy w<b/h+p, i.e. to be in a situation where it is more financially advantageous to
meet the newborn’s care labor demand herself than to find a substitute for her unpaid care labor
and be employed. 2
The replacement costs model is clearly related to the opportunity costs model. Our model aims to offer a
reinterpretation and revision that more strongly emphasizes the intensity of constraints on labor supply that arise

2
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The replacement costs framework offers straightforward predictions about the impacts of
the care infrastructure on birth penalties. There are two types of care infrastructure policy that
directly intervene into replacement costs: (a) policies that shape the availability and prices of
paid caregiver services (determines the parameter p in the simple model above), and (b) policies
that provide income transfers for unpaid caregiving (determine the parameter b in the simple
model above). By structuring the feasibility and tradeoffs associated with replacing unpaid care
labor, care infrastructures shape the distribution of birth penalties across families and determine
whether births result in increases in family income inequality or not. Births will increase family
inequality if birth penalties are systematically larger for lower income families, they will reduce
family income inequality if birth penalties are systematically larger for higher income families,
or they will result in no change in family income inequality if birth penalties do not impact
family income or if the impact is even across families. Care infrastructures with high
replacement costs (p is high, b is low) will trend towards the first scenario (births increase family
income inequality). High replacement costs due to expensive paid care services will tend to
hamper mothers’ labor supply in lower income families more strongly than in higher income
families, resulting in systematically larger birth penalties in the former compared to the latter.
High replacement costs due to low income transfers for caregivers lead to lower family incomes
when mothers do not work. By contrast, our replacement costs model predicts that care
infrastructures with low replacement costs (i.e., p is low or b is high) will trend towards the
second or third scenarios (births decrease or do not impact family income inequality). In a low
replacement costs context, the size of birth penalties will tend to be less structured by family
income because everyone can equally access paid caregiver services to substitute for unpaid care
from care labor demand shock events, such as births, and to articulate in detail how these constraints are structured
by care infrastructures.
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labor and/or receive income transfers for unpaid caregiving that offset earnings losses from
reducing paid work labor supply. The next section presents the US care infrastructure context
that we characterize as a high replacement costs context.
The U.S. Care Infrastructure
The United States care infrastructure is characterized by high replacement costs. The United
States is one of the OCED countries where access to childcare services is most expensive and
most dependent on purchasing power (OECD 2020). Unlike other high-income countries, the US
does not have a comprehensive policy guaranteeing affordable childcare access for all families
(Chaudry et al. 2017; Cooke 2011; Folbre 2012; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Morgan 2006,
2006). Historically, attempts to develop comprehensive childcare policy have failed in large part
due to efforts to protect the male-breadwinner family model and resistance to increased
government spending on social services (Michel 1999; Swinth 2018). 3 Furthermore, the United
States does not have any substantial income transfer program for unpaid caregivers. There is no
comprehensive paid leave policy, and the income transfer programs that exist for families with
children are generally conditional on mothers’ paid work (e.g., from the perspective of single
mothers both EITC and TANF are conditional on employment and cannot thus be considered to
transfer income for unpaid caregiving) (Cancian and Danziger 2009).
Since the 1970s, government intervention in childcare provision has been relatively
marginal and resulted in a two-tiered market system of childcare (Folbre 2012; Michel 1999;
Swinth 2018). For low-income families, the federal government provides childcare subsidies and

The 1940 Lanham Act, which established extensive childcare services for a brief moment during the Second World
War, was quickly dismantled as men returned from war (Michel 1999). And the 1970 Comprehensive Child
Development Act, which proposed extensive federal funding to develop affordable childcare services, was vetoed by
President Richard Nixon (Swinth 2018).

3
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the Head Start program. Neither of these two policies, however, come close to reaching all lowincome families, with estimates suggesting that only 8 to 15 percent of eligible families access
childcare subsidies (Ullrich et al. 2019). For families with labor earnings, the federal government
provides childcare tax credits that only partially offset the costs of purchasing childcare services
on the market. More recently, some states and cities have rolled out affordable pre-kindergarten
programs covering three- and/or four-year-olds (Chaudry et al. 2017). Overall, costly and
privately provided care services are the only formal childcare available to most families in the
United States. In practice, this means that the cost of childcare is prohibitive to many families,
thus constraining many families to rely on unpaid caregiving for young children.
There are numerous studies showing that higher childcare costs are associated with lower
labor supply among mothers in the United States. Point estimates vary across studies, but the
average effect size suggests that childcare costs constitute a substantial barrier to US mothers’
employment 4 (for recent reviews see Akgunduz and Plantega 2017; Morrissey 2016). Studies
also documented that childcare costs are associated with declines in mothers’ wages and earnings
(Andresen and Nix 2019; Gelbach 2002; Givord and Marbot 2015; Ha 2009; Press, Fagan, and
Laughlin 2006; Russo 2017; Schofield and Polette 2002; Wikström, Kotyrlo, and Hanes 2015).
Some studies have examined heterogeneity in the relationship between childcare costs and birth
penalties, but only with respect to mothers’ labor supply outcomes. Studies that assess
4

From studies reporting elasticities (change in probability of employment corresponding to 1 percent change in
childcare costs) and finding statistically significant results, estimates range from a low of -0.14 to a high of -1.1
(Blau and Robins 1988; Connelly 1992; Connelly and Kimmel 2003; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Mason and
Kuhlthau 1992; Ribar 1992, 1995; Tekin 2007). Other studies also find statistically significant declines in mothers’
employment associated with childcare prices (Ahn 2012; Bainbridge, Meyers, and Waldfogel 2003; Baum II 2002;
Cochi Ficano, Gennetian, and Morris 2006; Connelly and Kimmel 2003; Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzato 2009; Ha
2009; Heckman 1974; Herbst 2013; Kimmel 1998; Landivar, Scarborough, et al. 2021; Landivar, Ruppanner, and
Scarborough 2021; Ruppanner et al. 2021; Ruppanner, Moller, and Sayer 2019). Only a few studies find no
substantial relationship between childcare costs and mothers’ labor supply (Ribar 1995; Connelly 1990; Blau and
Robins 1991; Michalopoulos et al. 1992).
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heterogeneity by family income find that the employment of mothers in lower-income families is
more sensitive to childcare costs than in higher-income families (Baum II 2002; Tekin 2007b),
and studies assessing heterogeneity by mothers’ level of education find that sensitivity to
childcare prices is higher among mothers with lower levels of education (Anderson and Levine
1999; Kaestner et al. 2016; Ruppanner et al. 2021). Additionally, one US study shows that Head
Start programs correlate with lower poverty levels among families with children (Scarborough et
al. 2021).
The two sets of studies finding heterogeneity by family income and mothers’ education
are consistent with our expectation that contexts with high replacement costs will lead to larger
birth penalties for mothers with lower earnings potential. However, these studies do not directly
examine earnings penalties or family income penalties, and research examining the impact of
childcare costs on mothers’ wages and earnings has not evaluated heterogeneity as extensively
(Andresen and Nix 2019; Gelbach 2002; Givord and Marbot 2015; Ha 2009; Press et al. 2006;
Russo 2017; Schofield and Polette 2002; Wikström et al. 2015).

OUR STUDY
We focus on birth penalties and childcare prices to provide an empirical demonstration of the
relationship between births and family income inequality as delineated by the replacement costs
framework. We expect market-priced childcare provision to produce inequalities in how women
respond to birth events and how this impacts families’ incomes. More specifically, we
hypothesize that childcare costs will disproportionately constrain post-birth paid work for
women with lower earnings potential but less so for women with higher earnings potential. We
expect that these earnings losses will not be substantially offset by other sources of family
15

income, either partners’ earnings or income transfers. As a result, since women with lowerearnings potential are disproportionately in lower-to-middle income families, market-based
childcare will generate larger earnings losses for lower-income families compared to higherincome families and consequently increase family income inequality.
Our analysis is structured in two parts. The first section presents descriptive evidence to
examine the relationship between births and family income inequality. We track how family
income inequality changes around birth events and explore how these changes relate to women’s
income contributions to their families. The second section investigates the relationship between
childcare costs and birth penalties on mothers’ labor supply and earnings, their partners’ labor
supply and earnings, and their families’ incomes (including transfers). This analysis examines
how these relationships vary between mothers with high- versus low-earnings potential.

DATA AND METHODS
Data Sources and Samples
Our primary data source is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) (U.S. Census
Bureau 2001). The SIPP is a nationally representative household panel survey that began in 1984
and was designed as a continuous series of independent national panels with interviews every
four months for up to five years. The SIPP has a large sample size—each panel including 40,000
to 50,000 families since 1996—and tracks detailed monthly information about household and
family composition, employment, and earnings of all adult members, as well as other income
sources. The analyses use data from the 2008 and 2014 panels for which we can obtain statelevel childcare prices. In supplementary analyses we also use panel data from the Current

16

Population Survey (CPS) and county-level childcare prices data to address the concern that statelevel measures mask too much within-state variation (see Appendix Tables S1-S2).
Our analytical sample includes women ages 15 to 45 who gave birth over the course of
the panel survey, including first and higher-order births (N = 1,878). The results presented in this
article focus on the subsample of women partnered with men to provide parallel analyses for the
economic outcomes of their male partners, and supplementary analyses using the broader sample
of women partnered with men or women and unpartnered women are available in the Appendix
(see tables Table S3-S4). Regression analyses remove person-months observations for the six
months preceding the birth event to avoid contaminating our measures of pre-birth economic
position with pregnancy-related changes.
Measures
We examine the relationship between births and the following five outcome variables: mothers’
hours of work, their partners’ hours of work, mothers’ monthly earnings, their partners’ monthly
earnings, and family income.
Birth transitions are measured using a dummy variable that equals 0 before the birth and
equals 1 after the birth. This measure draws on time-varying monthly information about the
number and ages of own children living in the household over the course of the panel. Birth
events are operationalized as the increment in the number of own zero-year-olds in the
household.
Hours of paid work is measured as a continuous variable that ranges from 0 (not
employed) to 80. We use information on usual weekly hours of work as a synthetic measure of
labor supply on the intensive and extensive margins.
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Earnings is a continuous variable that measures monthly pre-tax earnings from labor,
including self-employment and/or business income. Earnings are adjusted for inflation and
expressed in 2010 dollars.
Family income is a continuous variable that measures monthly pre-tax family income.
This measure equals the sum of earnings from labor and income transfers from all adult members
of the family plus income transfers linked to children in the family, for example, Supplemental
Security Income payments received by children under 15. Family income is adjusted for inflation
and expressed in 2010 dollars.
Women’s earnings potential is a time-fixed dummy variable indicating completion of
college degree (0 = no college degree, 1 = college degree). We use women’s level of education
as a proxy for earnings potential because it allows us to identify groups that vary in their longrun earnings potential.
Childcare costs is a continuous variable indicating the state-level average price for
center- and family-based childcare services for zero-to-three-year-olds. Data about childcare
prices comes from the advocacy group Childcare Aware, which provides the longest-running
public data on state-level childcare prices in the United States. Their data is released in annual
reports on their website (https://www.childcareaware.org/) and has been used in related research
in the past (Landivar, Scarborough, et al. 2021; Landivar, Ruppanner, et al. 2021; Ruppanner et
al. 2021; Ruppanner, Moller, and Sayer 2019). Childcare prices are adjusted for inflation and
expressed in 2010 dollars. In supplementary analyses we use recently released data by the
Women’s Bureau at the U.S. Department of Labor tracking childcare prices at the county level.
For more information see the Appendix section on “Analyses with CPS and county-level
childcare costs measures and Tables S1-S2.
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Individual-level controls. We construct measures for age, age at birth, birth parity, marital
status (0 = married, 1 = not married), and partners’ level of education (0 = no college degree, 1 =
college degree). Time-invariant variables, such as age at birth or birth parity are used to control
for heterogeneity in the relationship between birth events and outcomes (i.e., they are interacted
with the birth event indicator). We also construct an indicator variable that identifies subsequent
births during the panel; this variable equals 0 before and 1 after the subsequent birth.
State-level controls. We construct measures for state-level time-varying characteristics
that could confound our estimates about the relationship between childcare costs and birth
penalties. We measure state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment
level, and women’s average wages. The GDP per capita measure comes from Bureau of
Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov). Data on women’s employment and wages is calculated
using the CPS-ASEC files (Flood et al. 2021). Women’s employment level is measured as the
proportion of working-age women employed, and average wages are calculated based on the
sample of full-time, full-year women workers. In supplementary analyses we use measures on
women’s employment and wages separately for women with a college degree and without a
college degree to address the possibility of diverging time-varying trends in labor market
characteristics for the two groups of women.
Methods
We use individual-level fixed effects regression models to examine how birth events impact
mothers’ labor supply and earnings, their partners’ labor supply and earnings, and their families’
incomes. These models only leverage within-individual variation in the outcome variable, thus
controlling for time-constant unobserved differences across individuals that could confound the
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relationships of interest. An example of such unobserved differences is differences in specific
labor market skills that are not captured by education. Our analyses focus on estimating how
birth penalties are moderated by childcare prices and testing whether this moderation varies
between mothers without a college degree and mothers with a college degree. We begin by
estimating the same model separately for the two groups of mothers. This model can be
formalized as follows:
(1)

𝑐𝑐
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽𝛽1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝑿𝑿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +

𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 𝒁𝒁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 + 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑐𝑐
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
is an economic outcome (e.g., paid work hours) for an individual i from group c (0

= no college degree, 1 = college degree) in state s, month m, and year y. 𝛽𝛽1 is the birth indicator

capturing within-person changes in the outcome variable before versus after the birth of a child.
Recall that our sample includes first births and higher-order births. 𝛽𝛽2 is a coefficient for the

variable childcare costs (CC). 𝛽𝛽3 is a coefficient for the interaction between the birth event and
childcare costs, which captures how the impact of births on outcome variables varies with
childcare costs. 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 are coefficients corresponding to time-varying individual-level control

variables (𝑿𝑿𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) for age, marital status, and subsequent births. 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟 are coefficients

corresponding to time-varying state-level control variables (𝒁𝒁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ), such as state GDP or

women’s average wage. 𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 are state fixed effects, 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦 are year fixed effects, 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 are calendar

month fixed effects, and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 indicate individual fixed effects. ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the individual error term.

We estimate a pooled fully interacted model to examine whether the impact of childcare

costs on birth penalties varies systematically between the two groups of mothers. This model
interacts each of the terms included in equation (1) with the time-invariant college dummy
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measure of women’s earnings potential, including a three-way interaction between births,
childcare costs, and women’s education. This three-way interaction tests for the difference
between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree. All
models remove observations for the six months prior to birth to avoid capturing economic

changes during pregnancy. All models compute robust standard errors clustered at the state level,
since this is the level of measurement for our main independent variable of interest, i.e. childcare
costs.
These regression models estimate key coefficients of interest solely leveraging withinindividual within-state over-time variation. That is, the coefficient for the interaction between
births and childcare costs is estimated by evaluating how within-individual changes pre versus
post births vary across births taking place in the same state as prices for childcare services
change over time. For example, we compare the change in earnings for two observationally
identical women in California, where one gave birth in 2008, and the other in 2016, with prices
of childcare being 27 percent higher in real terms in 2008 than in 2016. The models provide
unbiased estimates of the effect of childcare costs on outcomes if specific assumptions hold. The
estimates net out time-invariant unobserved characteristics at the individual and state level, but
they can be confounded by unmeasured time-varying characteristics correlated with variation in
childcare costs. For instance, if increasing childcare prices were correlated with increasing
employer discrimination against mothers in non-professional jobs, the three-way interaction
could be upwardly biased because it would pick up larger declines in post-birth employment for
mothers without a college degree compared to mothers with a college degree resulting from both
increasing childcare prices and employer discrimination. Similarly, if changing attitudes about
motherhood and employment correlated with changing childcare prices, this could also confound
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the key estimates of interest. Additionally, if selection into having births changes over time and
is correlated with childcare costs, this could also impact our estimates. This correlation could be
accidental, or it could be causal if childcare prices contribute to changing selection patterns.
Rising childcare prices, for instance, might discourage fertility among women with
disadvantageous labor market traits and make births more positively selected, or conversely, they
might discourage fertility among women with advantageous labor market traits and make births
less positively selected. If childcare costs shape selection patterns, our estimates of childcare
costs impacts are still valid for the population of women, but the estimates may not represent the
cost to individual women who may select into having a child when childcare costs change. We
further discuss potential sources of bias and sensitivity tests in the robustness checks section
below.
The analysis progresses as follows. First, we estimate baseline models that estimate birth
penalties and how they are moderated by childcare prices including controls only for age, and
state, year, month, and individual fixed effects. The second model adds a time-varying control
for subsequent births. The third model adds controls for time-varying marriage transitions and
for the interaction between births and age at birth, marital status at birth, and partners’ level of
education. These controls make sure that our key coefficient of interest is not confounded by
heterogeneity in how births impact economic outcomes by these characteristics. The fourth
model adds state-level time-varying controls for GDP per capita, women’s employment, and
women’s average wages.
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RESULTS
Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the analytical sample. The sample includes 1,878
partnered women who gave birth during the panel and 81,733 person-months observations. 48
percent of these births are first-order births, and the remainder are higher-order births. Women’s
average time in the sample is about 4 years (47 months). Women are on average 30.4 years of
age when they first enter the panel, and 42 percent of them hold a college degree. Descriptive
statistics for economic outcomes before versus after births show well-known patterns. Women’s
labor supply drops substantially after birth events, whereas men’s slightly increases. Women’s
average monthly earnings are lower after birth events, while men’s are substantially higher. The
average family income is slightly higher after births.
TABLE 1 HERE
Figure 1 provides descriptive evidence for the general claim that care events leave a mark
on family income inequality. This figure plots income inequality (measured with the coefficient
of variation) among families who experience a birth during the panel over months preceding and
following the birth event. The figure shows that family income inequality increases substantially
with births, beginning its increase during pregnancy months (-9 to -1), peaking at the month of
birth, and declining somewhat over the first few months following the birth but remaining stable
thereafter at a level higher than before birth. The difference in family income inequality between
-12 and +12 is .05, an increase that corresponds to about 40 percent of the increase in family
income inequality between 1967 and 2005 (Schwartz 2010). The increase in family income
inequality during pregnancy is somewhat surprising and suggests that childcare services are not
the only constrain impacting families’ incomes at this life-course juncture. These changes likely
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reflect pregnancy adjustments in employment and family composition that might be related or
unrelated to childcare prices.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 also displays simulated counterfactual trends showing how family income
inequality would evolve if women’s earnings remained constant. To generate this trend, we
calculate each woman’s average monthly earnings for the period between two years and six
months before the birth (months -24 to -6), and we assign this value to all observations after the
birth. This exercise indicates that changes in family income inequality following births strongly
reflect changes in women’s earnings, as opposed to reflecting changes in men’s earnings or other
income transfers families might receive. In particular, changes in family income inequality are
strongly related to changes in earnings among women without a college degree. If the earnings of
women without a college degree remained at their pre-birth levels, family income inequality
would not increase at birth. The same does not hold for women with a college degree. If the
earnings of women with a college degree remained at their pre-birth levels, family income
inequality would still substantially increase.
This descriptive evidence shows that births have a marked impact on the distribution of
family income among families experiencing a birth. While it is generally recognized that birth
events come with major shifts in women’s labor supply and earnings and play a key role in
structuring gender inequality, the relationship between births and family income inequality has
not been explored. The next section examines whether childcare prices shape birth penalties for
mothers with and without a college degree in ways that might contribute to this increase in
family income inequality. If childcare prices exacerbate gaps in women’s labor supply responses
to birth events, these patterns might contribute to increases in family income inequality.
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Childcare costs and labor supply
Table 2 presents results for regression models examining the relationship between childcare costs
and labor supply responses to birth events for women (Panel A) and their partners (Panel B). The
table reports coefficients from four models estimated for the two groups of mothers separately,
as well as the three-way interaction term from the pooled model testing whether the interaction
between births and childcare costs systematically differs between the two groups of women (𝛽𝛽3
for mothers without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for mothers with a college degree).
TABLE 2 HERE

The results indicate that childcare costs moderate the impact of births on paid work hours
for women without a college degree but not for women with a college degree or for men. Births
are associated with substantial declines in hours of paid work for both groups of mothers,
although birth penalties are larger for mothers without a college degree. Using Model 4, we
estimate that births result in a 9-hour decline in weekly paid work hours for mothers without a
college degree and a 6-hour decline for mothers with a college degree. The interaction between
births and childcare prices is only statistically significant for mothers without a college degree.
In Model 4, this interaction indicates that an increase in one unit in childcare costs (which
amounts to an increase of a $1,000 or an 11% increase on the average annual price for childcare
services) is associated with an additional 0.7-hour decline in weekly paid work for women
without a college degree. The same coefficient for the college group is much smaller and not
statistically significant. Despite the difference in size between the two interaction coefficients,
the three-way interaction coefficient from the pooled model is not statistically significant.
Comparing coefficients across regression models reveals that the key estimates of interest do not
substantially change as models incorporate controls for potential confounding processes. Model
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3, which adds controls to allow for heterogeneity in birth penalties by birth order, marital status,
and partners’ education, only slightly reduces the size of the coefficients for birth penalties and
the interaction with childcare costs for mothers without a college degree.
Figure 2 Panel A illustrates the results more intuitively by plotting average marginal
effects (AME) of births across levels of childcare costs and by women’s education using results
from Model 4. Childcare costs are measured in 1,000s of dollars (in 2010 dollars) and are mean
centered at $9,500, in other words, the value -4 represents a context in which annual childcare
costs are $4,000 below the mean, or equal $5,500, and the value +2 illustrates a context in which
childcare costs are $2,000 above the mean, or $11,500. The plotted childcare costs range covers
90 percent of the observed variation in childcare prices. The first bars on the left-side represent
the size of the birth penalty in the most affordable childcare cost scenario, showing that in this
context births are associated with a 5-hour decline in paid work for both groups of women. As
childcare costs increase, the birth penalties become larger for mothers without a college degree
but do not change for mothers with a college degree. In the most expensive childcare costs
context, births are associated with a 12-hours decline in paid work for mothers without a college
degree but only with a 5-hour decline for mothers with a college degree. The differences across
levels of childcare costs are statistically significant for mothers without a college degree but not
statistically significant for mothers with a college degree. These results are consistent with
previous studies finding that the labor supply of women with lower earnings potential is more
sensitive to the affordability of childcare services than the labor supply of women with higher
earnings potential (Anderson and Levine 1999; Kaestner et al. 2016; Ruppanner et al. 2021).
FIGURE 2 HERE
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Table 2 Panel B displays regression results for models on men’s paid work hours. Based
on existing research, we did not anticipate births or childcare costs to markedly shape men’s
labor supply, not even to offset the declines in women’s labor supply. The results support these
expectations. The analyses show that for men births are associated with small and statistically
insignificant changes in paid work hours. The interaction between births and childcare prices is
not statistically significant for men partnered either with mothers without a college degree or
with mothers with a college degree. However, for men partnered to mothers without a college
degree, the interaction coefficient is positive and suggests a slight moderation pattern in the
opposite direction to the one we find for mothers. Figure 2 Panel B presents these results
visually. For men partnered to mothers without a college degree, the average marginal effect of
births is small and grows more positive with increasing childcare costs. This pattern is consistent
with the idea that men’s labor supply might compensate for losses in women’s labor supply that
grow larger with childcare costs, but the size of this compensatory pattern is very small and not
statistically significant. For men partnered with mothers with a college degree birth effects are
small, positive, and do not substantially vary across childcare prices.
Childcare costs and labor earnings
Table 3 presents results for regression analyses of mothers’ monthly earnings (Panel A) and their
partners’ monthly earnings (Panel B). As in Table 2, we report coefficients from four models
estimated for the two groups of mothers separately, as well as the three-way interaction terms
from the pooled models testing whether the interaction between births and childcare costs
systematically differs between the two groups of women (𝛽𝛽3 for mothers without a college
degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for mothers with a college degree).
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TABLE 3 HERE
The results for the regression on labor earnings follow patterns remarkably similar to the
results on paid work hours, illustrating how changes in paid work hours translate into changes in
earnings. We find that births are associated with substantial earnings losses for both groups of
women, but that childcare costs moderate the size of these birth penalties only for mothers
without a college degree. The interaction coefficient between births and childcare costs for
women without a college degree is negative and statistically significant, and it indicates that a
one-unit change in childcare costs is associated with a 10 percent decline in monthly earnings
(from Table 3 Model 4, exp(-0.11)-1 = -0.10). This same coefficient for mothers with a college
degree is positive and not statistically significant. The three-way interaction coefficient is
statistically significant indicating that the interaction between births and childcare costs are
systematically different for the two groups of women: the earnings of women without a college
degree are significantly more negatively affected by childcare costs that the earnings of women
with a college degree.
Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates these results visually. Similar to our results for paid work
hours, we find that in the context of affordable childcare services, the size of the birth penalty is
similar for the two groups of women and amounts to about a 65 percent decline in monthly
earnings (from Table 3 Model 4, exp(-1.05)-1 = -0.65). For women without a college degree, the
size of this birth penalty grows as childcare prices increase, and the differences across levels of
childcare costs are statistically significant. For women with a college degree the birth penalty
becomes slightly smaller, although these differences across levels of childcare costs are not
statistically significant.
FIGURE 3 HERE
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The results for men’s monthly earnings are also generally similar to the results for their
paid work hours. For men, births are associated with much smaller changes in monthly earnings
compared to women, and the impact of births is not noticeably moderated by state-level
childcare prices. For men partnered with women without a college degree, births are associated
with small but statistically significant increases in monthly earnings. These increases might stem
from increases in wages and also increases in work hours (Table 2 shows that births are
associated with increases in paid work hours for this group, although these coefficients are not
statistically significant).
Taken together, the analyses of monthly earnings indicate that higher childcare prices are
associated with a widening of the earnings gap between mothers without college degrees and
mothers with college degrees. Comparing birth penalties on mothers’ earnings across levels of
childcare prices indicates that, ceteris paribus, birth events do not substantially affect earnings
gaps among women when childcare prices are low (birth penalties are similar in size for both
groups of women), but they do as childcare costs increase. Moving from the most affordable to
the least affordable childcare costs scenario increases the difference in percentage decline in
earnings between the two groups of mothers by 63 percentage points. Unless this widening gap is
compensated by other income sources, and the results for men’s earnings suggest that changes in
men’s earnings are not offsetting the losses in women’s labor income, these widening gaps in
women’s earnings will translate into widening gaps in family income as well.
Childcare costs and family income
Table 4 present results for models of family income. As before, we report coefficients from four
models estimated for the two groups of mothers separately and report the three-way interaction
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terms from the pooled models testing whether the interaction between births and childcare costs
systematically differs between the two groups of women (𝛽𝛽3 for mothers without a college
degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for mothers with a college degree).

TABLE 4 HERE

The results on family income repeat the patterns found in models on labor supply and
earnings, indicating that birth penalties on mothers’ outcomes translate into marked family
income losses without notable income offsets via partners’ earnings or transfers. As in preceding
analyses, we find that for women without a college degree births are associated with declines in
family income that grow larger as childcare costs increase. We estimate that a one-unit increase
in childcare costs is associated with an additional 5 percent decline in family income, and this
coefficient is statistically significant (from Table 4 Model 4, exp(-0.05)-1 = -0.05). For women
without a college degree, childcare costs do not moderate the relationship between births and
family income. The three-way interaction testing for the difference between the two interaction
coefficients is statistically significant and indicates that childcare costs moderate birth penalties
on family income differently for women with and without a college degree.
FIGURE 4 HERE
Figure 4 illustrates these results visually. We find that in the most affordable scenario,
birth penalties on family income are somewhat smaller for women without a college degree
compared to women with a college degree. In this childcare costs scenario, births are associated
with a 5 percent decline in family income for women without a college degree and a 18 percent
decline for women with a college degree. As childcare costs increase, the birth penalty on family
income for women without a college degree grows and the one for women with a college degree
remains roughly the same. In the most unaffordable childcare costs scenario, we estimate that
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births are associated with a 45 percent decline in family income for women without a college
degree and a 16 percent decline for women with a college degree, indicating a widening gap in
family income. Moving from the most affordable to the least affordable childcare costs scenario
increases the difference in percentage decline in family income between the two groups of
mothers by 29 percentage points. This result, together with the descriptive finding indicating that
the evolution of family income inequality around births is most sensitive to changes in earnings
of women without a college degree, is consistent with the expectation that births, and childcare
costs play a role in the production of family income inequality.
Other sensitivity checks and robustness tests
We conducted several sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our findings to different
measures of childcare costs as well as different model specifications. Our results are robust to
using a more geographically detailed measure of childcare costs at the county level. Appendix
Tables S1-S2 present results for analogous analyses using panel data from the Current
Population Survey and the Census Childcare costs database at the county level to examine the
relationship between births, childcare costs, and mothers’ and fathers’ labor supply. In these
analyses we also find that childcare costs increase birth penalties for mothers without a college
degree but not for mothers with a college degree or for fathers. Our conclusions also apply to a
broader analytical sample including unpartnered mothers. Appendix Tables S3-S4 presents the
analyses for this broader analytical sample and shows similar results. Unpartnered mothers
represent a larger share of mothers in the no-college group compared to the college group. The
results indicate that our estimates of childcare costs–induced increases in birth penalties are
robust to also including unpartnered women in the sample. These findings are consistent with
previous research showing sensitivity to childcare prices among unpartnered women (Connelly
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and Kimmel 2003; Han and Waldfogel 2001; Kimmel 1998). Supplementary analyses we
analyzed the impact of births and childcare costs on hourly wages (see Appendix Table S5). The
results are also robust to controls for number and ages of children in the household and to
controls for the differential impact of births by race (see Appendix Tables S6-S7).

DISCUSSION
This article advances a replacement costs approach to describe how two core dimensions of the
care infrastructure—care services and income transfers for unpaid caregiving—can shape the
economic consequences of care events on family income inequality. The framework integrates
the study of birth penalties within a broader framework that centers care labor needs (Folbre
2012; Folbre and Wright 2012). We provide an empirical demonstration of the relationship
between care services, care event penalties, and family income inequality, focusing on birth
penalties and childcare prices in the United States. Our results show that childcare costs increase
birth penalties on labor supply and earnings for mothers without a college degree but not for
women with a college degree or for the male partners of either group of mothers. We find that
this uneven distribution of birth penalties induced by childcare costs translates into a widening
gap in family income, showing that partners’ earnings and transfers are unable to compensate for
the widening inequality in women’s earnings.
An important goal of our study has been to propose the care infrastructure as an
important set of institutions to understand family income inequality. Prevailing research on
drivers of family income inequality has largely focused on mechanisms related to labor market or
family formation forces (McCall and Percheski 2010; Schwartz 2010; Sudo 2017; Western et al.
2016). For instance, two dominant explanations about rising family income inequality in the
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United States relate to wage dispersion and rising prevalence of single-parent households
(McCall and Percheski 2010). Our framework, instead, sheds light on the way societies structure
resources for individuals experiencing care events as an additional important area to understand
the processes producing family income inequalities. In extensions of this work, we are
comparatively examining whether one reason why social democratic welfare states are more
egalitarian than liberal ones is due to their more egalitarian care infrastructures. Our study
provides a conceptual framework to connect with the literature examining the relationship
between women’s employment and family income inequality (Cancian and Reed 1998, 1999;
Esping-Andersen 2007; Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz 2017; Gonalons-Pons, Schwartz, and
Musick 2021; Permanyer, Esteve, and Garcia 2019; Sudo 2017). Our perspective also adds to the
emerging literature about how care infrastructure shapes parental investments and time spent
with young children (Jackson and Schneider 2022).
Our study broadens the scope of research on birth penalties in several directions. First, we
expand on how birth penalties play a role in structuring not only gender inequality but also
family income inequality. The research on motherhood penalties has enormously advanced our
understanding of birth penalties, and our contribution extends this line of work to think more
comprehensively about how care events impact personal income and family income inequality.
This contributes to the emerging research examining how births impact economic outcomes
beyond mothers’ or fathers’ labor market positions and incorporating public transfers (Aassve et
al. 2005; Bould et al. 2012; Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2007; Stanczyk 2020). Furthermore,
by providing a framework that connects births to other care events, we aim to encourage more
systematic communication between research about the impact of births and research about the
impact of other care events, such as the onset of disability or dementia (Coe, Skira, and Larson
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2018; Coe and Van Houtven 2009). These two types of studies have been typically separated
from each other, with only a few recent studies starting to integrate them (Lightman and Link
2021).
This study provides new evidence to understand the relationship between childcare costs
and birth penalties in the United States. We implement an improved and more robust
identification model compared to most previous research. Most studies examining how childcare
costs shape birth penalties rely on cross-sectional models that compare mothers to non-mothers,
exposing the estimates to potential confounder bias due to systematic differences in unobserved
characteristics between the two groups. By leveraging panel models, we address this key source
of confounder bias, and we can more precisely estimate the impact of childcare costs at the
crucial moment of birth transitions. Our estimates are comparatively less robust than studies
examining questions about childcare costs utilizing policy changes, because these studies can
more robustly claim that the estimates rely on exogenous changes in childcare costs (Andresen
and Nix 2019; Cascio 2009; Fitzpatrick 2010; Gelbach 2002; Herbst 2017; Russo 2017).
Although our models include state and year fixed effects as well as state-level time-varying
controls to address potential confounder biases coming from time-varying unobserved processes,
we cannot be certain that these controls remove all possible confounders that affect both
childcare costs and families’ outcomes. The advantage of our estimates relative to policyintervention studies is that we can obtain a broader estimate that is not specific to the scope of
the policy.
This study has several limitations. Our estimates rely on a measure of childcare costs that
ignore within-state heterogeneity in prices for childcare services. This measure is less than ideal,
and we pursued more geographically fine-grained data at the county level to conduct sensitivity
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analyses (see Appendix Tables S1-S2). The robustness of our core findings to analyses using the
county-level data is reassuring, but even county-level prices ignore real-world price
heterogeneity across local childcare markets. This data limitation means that our estimates rely
on the implicit assumption that changes in prices at the regional level reflect roughly
proportional changes in prices across the region (i.e., if the average price in Pennsylvania
increases, we hope this reflects similar increases across the state). Note that this type of
measurement error will tend to downwardly bias our estimates. Another limitation is that our
data covers a relatively narrow observation window spanning two years before and after birth
events. Longer panel data could enable studying how long lasting the impacts of births on family
income and family income inequality are.
Our study has clear policy implications. We show that a robust childcare infrastructure
would contribute to reduce family income inequality at a key life period for young children’s
lives. Our framework more generally implies that robust care infrastructures that support people
through care events by facilitating the possibility to rely on paid caregivers (and/or providing
income transfers to offset earnings losses resulting from providing unpaid care) can help reduce
family income inequality. Human societies require and mobilize a lot of care labor to fulfill the
care needs of children, working-age adults, and older adults. This care labor is often taken for
granted, naturalized, made invisible, and only during the COVID-19 pandemic has its relevance
become a bit more visible. Our framework and empirical study aim to contribute to the efforts of
further making visible the social relevance of care labor and the way it is socially organized by
articulating how the social organization of care provision structures family income inequality.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the analytical sample
Pre-birth

Post-birth

Employment

66%

58%

Work hours (weekly)

24.15

20.23

(19.84)

(19.86)

2043.80

1817.25

(2930.19)

(3198.44)

Men's employment

90%

91%

Men's work hours (weekly)

39.26

40.03

(19.84)

(19.87)

3874.50

4321.56

(4586.25)

(5438.07)

5900.73

6180.73

(6129.89)

(6897.62)

Earnings (monthly)

Men's earnings (monthly)
Family income (monthly)
N (persons)

1,878

N (person-months)

81,733

Observations (mean)

46.88

Age (mean)

30.44

College education

42%

Source: SIPP 2008–2018.
Note: Earnings and income are expressed in 2010 dollars.
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Table 2. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on weekly paid work hours
Model 1
No college
College

Model 2
No college
College

Model 3
No college
College

Model 4
No college
College

-9.490***
(1.545)
0.924
(0.502)
-0.717*
(0.283)

-9.562***
(1.585)
0.939
(0.505)
-0.707*
(0.287)

-9.125***
(1.834)
0.714
(0.580)
-0.664*
(0.283)

-9.124***
(1.830)
0.718
(0.582)
-0.680*
(0.287)

Panel A. Women
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)

-6.913***
(1.000)
0.408
(0.330)
-0.137
(0.175)

0.580
(0.353)

-7.280***
(1.040)
0.369
(0.324)
-0.117
(0.176)

0.590
(0.355)

-6.134***
(1.661)
0.311
(0.318)
-0.0369
(0.180)

0.627
(0.358)

-6.202***
(1.659)
0.342
(0.323)
-0.0639
(0.179)

0.616
(0.358)

Panel B. Men
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )

1.141
(0.899)
-0.154
(0.496)
0.296
(0.223)

0.988
(0.769)
-0.0501
(0.269)
-0.0875
(0.198)

1.050
(0.884)
-0.134
(0.482)
0.308
(0.224)

1.190
(0.757)
-0.0278
(0.267)
-0.0973
(0.200)

2.018
(1.042)
-0.208
(0.478)
0.369
(0.228)

0.586
(1.334)
-0.0594
(0.261)
-0.0821
(0.211)

2.025
(1.038)
-0.218
(0.482)
0.393
(0.229)

0.525
(1.345)
-0.0341
(0.259)
-0.105
(0.207)

Three-way interaction (pooled model)

-0.384
(0.340)

-0.405
(0.338)

-0.451
(0.358)

-0.498
(0.356)

N observations
N couples

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

Source: SIPP 2008–2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.580 = (-.137) - (-.717). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and control
for women’s age and age squared. Model 2 adds a control identifying additional birth transitions during the survey. Model 3 includes two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education,
women’s age at birth, and marital status. Model 4 controls for state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the
state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table 3. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on monthly earnings (logged)
Model 1
No college
College

Model 2
No college
College

Model 3
No college
College

Model 4
No college
College

-1.946***
(0.280)
0.125
(0.0726)
-0.113*
(0.0489)

-1.999***
(0.283)
0.107
(0.0671)
-0.104*
(0.0478)

-1.810***
(0.344)
0.0985
(0.0816)
-0.108*
(0.0513)

-1.803***
(0.342)
0.0948
(0.0828)
-0.109*
(0.0518)

Panel A. Women
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)

-1.189***
(0.192)
0.0466
(0.0781)
0.0356
(0.0257)

0.148**
(0.0554)

-1.262***
(0.196)
0.0392
(0.0775)
0.0395
(0.0262)

0.150**
(0.0559)

-1.117**
(0.349)
0.0197
(0.0771)
0.0564
(0.0285)

0.165**
(0.0596)

-1.133**
(0.350)
0.0265
(0.0769)
0.0512
(0.0294)

0.161**
(0.0598)

Panel B. Men
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)
N observations
N couples
Source: SIPP 2008–2018

0.321
(0.167)
0.0714
(0.0707)
-0.0139
(0.0358)

0.0605
(0.0953)
-0.0295
(0.0380)
0.0261
(0.0254)

0.319
(0.170)
0.0719
(0.0698)
-0.0136
(0.0361)

0.0644
(0.0976)
-0.0291
(0.0379)
0.0259
(0.0255)

0.497*
(0.206)
0.0567
(0.0679)
-0.00485
(0.0385)

0.0653
(0.186)
-0.0304
(0.0376)
0.0268
(0.0265)

0.496*
(0.206)
0.0573
(0.0668)
-0.00495
(0.0390)

0.0505
(0.188)
-0.0237
(0.0363)
0.0210
(0.0252)

0.040
(0.0493)

0.040
(0.0497)

0.032
(0.0511)

0.026
(0.0506)

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.148 = (.0356) - (-.113). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and control
for women’s age and age squared. Model 2 adds a control identifying additional birth transitions during the survey. Model 3 includes two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education,
women’s age at birth, and marital status. Model 4 controls for state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the
state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table 4. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on family income (logged)

Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)

N observations
N couples
Source: SIPP 2008–2018

Model 1
No college
College

Model 2
No college
College

-0.249
(0.129)
0.0334
(0.0587)
-0.0573**
(0.0207)

-0.264*
(0.128)
0.0366
(0.0590)
-0.0553**
(0.0204)

-0.123*
(0.0549)
-0.0223
(0.0188)
0.00769
(0.0101)

-0.126*
(0.0546)
-0.0227
(0.0189)
0.00785
(0.0101)

Model 3
No college
College
-0.196
(0.148)
0.0307
(0.0589)
-0.0526*
(0.0210)

-0.0996
(0.0722)
-0.0229
(0.0190)
0.00898
(0.0103)

Model 4
No college
College
-0.188
(0.147)
0.0245
(0.0579)
-0.0525*
(0.0205)

-0.103
(0.0709)
-0.0216
(0.0193)
0.00819
(0.0100)

0.0649**
(0.0229)

0.0632**
(0.0226)

0.0616*
(0.0234)

0.0606*
(0.0228)

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.0649 = (.00769) - (-.0573). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and
control for women’s age and age squared. Model 2 adds a control identifying additional birth transitions during the survey. Model 3 includes two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education,
women’s age at birth, and marital status. Model 4 controls for state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the
state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Figure 1. Family income inequality around birth events

Source: SIPP 2008–2018
Note: Figure 1 plots the coefficient of variation (CV) for family income among families who experience a birth
during the panel. Counterfactual trends illustrate how the coefficient of variation would change if women’s earnings
did not change with birth events. Counterfactual 1 sets all women’s earnings constant to their pre-birth values,
counterfactual 2 sets only the earnings of women without a college degree constant to their pre-birth values, and
counterfactual 3 sets only the earnings of women with a college degree constant to their pre-birth values.
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Figure 2. Birth penalties on weekly paid work hours by mothers’ education and childcare costs
Panel A. Women

Panel B. Men

Source: SIPP 2008–2018
Note: Figure 2 plots the average marginal effect of births on women’s and men’s weekly paid work hours across levels of childcare costs based on the
regression analysis reported in Table 2 Model 4. The x-axis unit is annual childcare cost in 1000s of dollars (2010 dollars) centered at the mean ($9,500),
i.e., the value -4 indicates that annual childcare costs are $4,000 below the mean. The range covers 90% of the observed distribution in childcare prices.
The y-axis unit is weekly hours of work, the value -5 indicates that births are associated with a 5-hour decline in weekly paid work hours.
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Figure 3. Birth penalties on monthly earnings (logged) by mothers’ education and childcare costs
Panel A. Women

Panel B. Men

Source: SIPP 2008–2018
Note: Figure 3 plots the average marginal effect of births on women’s and men’s monthly earnings across levels of childcare costs based on the regression
equation reported in Table 3 Model 4. The x-axis covers 90% of the distribution in annual childcare cost (1000s of dollars in 2010 dollars) centered at the
mean ($9,500). The y-axis unit is monthly logged earnings, the value -1 represents a decline of one unit in monthly earnings on the log scale, or a decline
of about 63 percent in monthly earnings, exp(-1)-1 = -.63.

50

Figure 4. Birth penalties on family monthly income (logged) by mothers’ education and childcare
costs

Source: SIPP 2008–2018
Note: Figure 4 plots the average marginal effect of births on family income (logged) across levels of childcare costs based on the regression equation
reported in Table 4 Model 4. The x-axis covers 90% of the distribution in annual childcare cost (1000s of dollars in 2010 dollars) centered at the mean
($9,500). The y-axis unit is monthly family logged income, the value -.2 represents a decline of .2 in family income on the log scale, or a decline of about
18% percent, exp(-.2)-1 = -.18.
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Proposed Online Appendix
ANALYSES WITH CPS AND COUNTY-LEVEL CHILDCARE COSTS MEASURES
The analyses presented in the main manuscript rely on state-level measures of childcare costs
that might mask important within-state heterogeneity in childcare prices. To address this
concern, we conducted sensitivity tests using panel data from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) and data on county-level childcare prices collected by the Women’s Bureau at the U.S.
Department of Labor. The CPS provides a larger sample size and county-level indicators that the
SIPP does not have. However, the CPS does not include sufficient repeated observations nor
comprehensive measures on earnings or information, limiting this sensitivity analyses to labor
supply outcomes only. Furthermore, the CPS covers a narrower window of observation around
birth events, as respondents are only observed for eight months over the span of 16 months
(respondents enter the sample for four consecutive month-waves, leave the sample for eight
waves, and then enter the sample again for four consecutive waves).
Table S1 presents the descriptive statistics corresponding to the CPS analytical sample. The
sample is defined following the same criteria we applied to the SIPP data. Table S2 presents the
results for panel regression analyses on work hours and employment. The findings are
remarkably consistent with the SIPP. We find that childcare costs exacerbate birth penalties on
mothers without a college degree but not for mothers with a college degree, or for men.
ANALYSES WITH THE FULL SAMPLE OF PARTNERED AND UNPARTNERED
MOTHERS
The analyses presented in the manuscript focus on the sample of mothers partnered to men to
present parallel results for mothers and their male partners. We conducted supplementary
analyses on a broader sample that includes women partnered to either men or women and
unpartnered women.
Table S3 presents the descriptive statistics for this broader analytical sample including partnered
and unpartnered women. Note that the unpartnered mothers represent a larger share of mothers
without a college degree. The share of women partnered to women is comparatively very small.
Table S4 reports results from regression analyses using this sample for all core outcome
variables. We report results for the equivalent of Model 4 in Tables 2-4 in the main manuscript.
For this analysis, measures about mothers’ partners include a category identifying mothers
without partners, i.e., partners’ education variable becomes a 3-category variable (0 = without a
college degree, 1 = college degree, 9 = without a partner). All these variables are entered as
factor variables.
The results show that the main pattern of findings applies to this broader sample. The values of
the interaction coefficient between births and childcare costs are somewhat smaller compared to
the results for partnered mothers only, suggesting that the sensitivity to childcare costs might be
somewhat lower among unpartnered mothers. Overall, the results confirm that childcare costs
also shape family income inequality in this broader sample.
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BIRTH PENALTIES ON HOURLY WAGES
Birth penalties in earnings can come from both changes in labor supply as well as wages. The
main analyses focus on changes in earnings stemming from reductions in labor supply but we
also examined how hourly wages change with birth events. Table S5 presents results for logged
hourly wages using the sample of partnered women and models analogous to Model 4 in Table 2.
We do not find evidence of statistically significant declines in hourly wages for either group of
women. This result is consistent with recent studies suggesting that motherhood wage penalties
are declining and becoming not statistically significant (Pal and Waldfogel 2016). However, we
find that for women without a college degree childcare costs generate statistically significant
birth penalties on hourly wages. This indicates that birth penalties in earnings reported in Table 3
are driven by both reductions in labor supply reported in Table 2 and declines in hourly wages
that grow with childcare costs.
SENSITIVITY TO HETEROGENEITY BY RACE CATEGORIES
Table S6 presents results that include controls for birth penalty heterogeneity by race category.
We report results for women’s outcomes for simplicity. The models reported correspond to
Models 4 in Tables 3-5 in the main manuscript. The results show that the main pattern of
findings is robust to controlling for variation in how birth penalties impact outcomes across race
categories.
SENSITIVITY TO CONTROLS FOR NUMBER AND AGES OF KIDS IN THE
HOUSEHOLD
Table S7 presents results that include controls for time-varying measures of number of children
in the household and age of the oldest child under 16 in the household. We report results for
women’s outcomes for simplicity. The models reported correspond to Models 4 in Tables 3-5 in
the main manuscript. The results show that the main pattern of findings is robust to controlling
for variation in the number and ages of children already in the household at the time of birth
events.
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Table S1. Descriptive Statistics CPS analytical sample
Pre-birth

Post-birth

Employment

70%

61%

Work hours (weekly)

25.75

21.61

(19.08)

(19.32)

Men's employment

90%

90%

Men's work hours (weekly)

38.87

38.68

(19.08)

(19.32)

N (persons)

5462

N (person-months)

44879

Observations (mean)

8

Age (mean)

30.97

College education

52%

Source: CPS 2008-2018
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Table S2. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on weekly paid work hours and employment with county-level childcare
price measures
Weekly work hours
No College
College
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )

-3.547***
(0.543)
-0.202
(0.268)
-0.107*
(0.0479)

-2.978***
(0.450)
-0.353
(0.288)
0.0142
(0.0424)

Women

Employment
No College
College
-0.0586***
(0.0143)
-0.00957
(0.00815)
-0.00425**
(0.00133)

-0.0484***
(0.0105)
-0.00536
(0.00950)
0.000252
(0.000920)

Weekly work hours
No College
College
0.729
(0.629)
0.0468
(0.304)
0.0144
(0.0284)

0.490
(0.485)
0.541
(0.358)
-0.0175
(0.0235)

Men

Employment
No College
College
-0.00256
(0.00944)
-0.00348
(0.00683)
0.000127
(0.000890)

0.00136
(0.0122)
0.0113*
(0.00468)
-0.00106
(0.000736)

Three-way interaction (pooled model)

0.121
(0.06)

0.00450**
(0.001)

-0.0319
(0.04)

-0.00119
(0.00)

N observations

44,879

44,879

44,879

44,879

N couples

5,462

5,462

5,462

5,462

Source: CPS 2008-2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.121 = (.0142) - (-.107). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and control
for women’s age and age squared, two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education, women’s age at birth, and marital status, and state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s
employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table S3. Descriptive statistics for SIPP analytical sample including unpartnered women
Employment
Work hours (weekly)
Earnings (monthly)
Men's employment
Men's work hours (weekly)
Men's earnings (monthly)
Family income (monthly
N (persons)
N (person-months)
Observations (mean)
Age (mean)
Cohabits with a partner
College education

Pre-birth
66%
24.20
(19.83)
2047.46
(2931.57)
90%
39.29
(19.83)
3879.68
(4588.09)
5908.29
(6132.35)

Source: SIPP 2008-2018.
Note: Earnings and income are expressed in 2010 dollars.

Post-birth
58%
20.25
(19.86)
1819.13
(3199.44)
91%
40.05
(19.87)
4324.63
(5439.67)
6186.05
(6899.25)

2710
108447
46.25
29.42
75%
34%
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Table S4. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on weekly paid hours, monthly labor earnings, and family income for the
sample including unpartnered women
Weekly work hours

Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)

N observations
N couples

Monthly earnings

Family income

No college

College

No college

College

No college

College

-8.185***

-6.411***

-1.603***

-1.120***

-0.428**

-0.236

(1.671)

(1.689)

(0.319)

(0.315)

(0.130)

(0.182)

0.549

0.321

0.0884

0.0166

0.0560

-0.0292

(0.431)

(0.326)

(0.0686)

(0.0723)

(0.0527)

(0.0211)

-0.510*

-0.0858

-0.0633*

0.0434

-0.0422*

0.0127

(0.194)

(0.202)

(0.0216)

(0.0330)

(0.0185)

(0.0129)

0.424

0.107*

0.0549*

(0.306)

(0.0470)

(0.0234)

108,447

108,447

108,447

2,710

2,710

2,710

Source: SIPP 2008-2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.424 = (-.0858) - (-.510) . All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and
control for women’s age and age squared, subsequent birth transitions during the survey, two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education, women’s age at birth, and marital status, and statelevel year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table S5. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on hourly wages (logged)

Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )
Three-way interaction (pooled model)

N observations
N couples

Women
No college
College

Men
No college
College

-0.0434
(0.0586)
-0.0343
(0.0261)
-0.0265**
(0.00898)

0.0557
(0.0479)
0.0398*
(0.0188)
-0.00233
(0.00956)

-0.0293
(0.0564)
-0.00213
(0.0138)
0.00164
(0.00853)

-0.0241
(0.0429)
-0.00726
(0.0146)
0.0104
(0.00709)

0.0281*
(0.014)

0.0128
(0.011)

58588
1878

58588
1878

Source: SIPP 2008-2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare
costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a
college degree, i.e., 0.0281 = (.00164) - (-.0265). Note that this analysis only includes regression with positive values for wages. All models
include state, year, and month fixed effects, and control for women’s age and age squared, subsequent birth transitions during the survey, twoway interactions between birth and partner’s education, women’s age at birth, and marital status, and state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per
capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table S6. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on mothers’ work hours, monthly earnings, and family income for
models that control for birth penalty heterogeneity across race categories

Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )

Work hours
No college
College

Monthly earnings (logged)
No college
College

-9.706***
(1.975)
0.738
(0.587)
-0.685*
(0.284)

-1.920***
(0.366)
0.0977
(0.0852)
-0.112*
(0.0506)

-6.230***
(1.612)
0.425
(0.356)
-0.0665
(0.173)

-1.131**
(0.353)
0.0299
(0.0809)
0.0463
(0.0282)

Family income
No college
College
-0.144
(0.134)
0.0250
(0.0517)
-0.0482*
(0.0200)

-0.167**
(0.0601)
-0.0258
(0.0215)
0.00817
(0.0101)

Three-way interaction (pooled model)

0.619
(0.343)

0.158**
(0.059)

0.0564*
(0.022)

N observations
N couples

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

Source: SIPP 2008-2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.619 = (-.0665) - (-.685). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and
control for women’s age and age squared, subsequent birth transitions during the survey, two-way interactions between birth and partner’s education, women’s age at birth, marital status, and women’s
race category (0 = white non-Hispanic, 1 = Black non-Hispanic, 2 = Hispanic, 3 = Other) and state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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Table S7. Panel regression analyses of birth penalties on mothers’ work hours, monthly earnings, and family income for
models that control for number and ages of kids in the household
Work hours
No college
College
Birth (𝛽𝛽1 )

Childcare costs (𝛽𝛽2 )

Birth * Childcare cost (𝛽𝛽3 )

-8.217**
(2.392)
0.717
(0.578)
-0.683*
(0.287)

-3.919
(2.017)
0.328
(0.328)
-0.0662
(0.177)

Monthly earnings (logged)
No college
College
-1.618***
(0.422)
0.0946
(0.0823)
-0.110*
(0.0518)

-0.689
(0.426)
0.0240
(0.0796)
0.0508
(0.0296)

Family income
No college
College
-0.00253
(0.168)
0.0232
(0.0517)
-0.0487*
(0.0201)

-0.101
(0.0756)
-0.0290
(0.0206)
0.00769
(0.0103)

Three-way interaction (pooled model)

0.618
(0.349)

0.161*
(0.062)

0.0557*
(0.023)

N observations
N couples

81733
1878

81733
1878

81733
1878

Source: SIPP 2008-2018
Notes: The three-way interaction coefficients come from the pooled and fully interacted models including interactions between birth, childcare costs, and women’s education. This interaction tests for
the difference between 𝛽𝛽3 for women without a college degree and 𝛽𝛽3 for women with a college degree, i.e., 0.618 = (-.0662) - (-.683). All models include state, year, and month fixed effects, and
control for women’s age and age squared, subsequent birth transitions during the survey, time-varying measures for the number of kids in the household and the age of the oldest child under 16, two-way
interactions between birth and partner’s education, women’s age at birth, marital status, and state-level year-to-year changes in GDP per capita, women’s employment, and women’s wages. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state level. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
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